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BOOK REVIEW
Crisis and Legitimacy: The Administrative Process and American
Government, by James 0. Freedman. Cambridge (U.K.) and New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1978. Pp. 266.
PAUL H. BRIETZKE
This is just the book to add flesh and blood to an administrative law course. It offers mainstream interpretations of the
impact of law and public opinion on administration, the difficulties
which arise in the course of economic regulation, claims to agency
expertise and independence, the extent of genuine public participation in decision-making, practical aspects of the delegation of
legislative powers, and the rational bases for administrative procedures, formal and informal. The book breaks down into three sections: an overview, "sources of crisis in the administrative process";
a brief but most informative assessment of the capacities and limitations of particular agencies, the SEC, EEOC and HEW; and a longer
inquiry into bureaucratic procedures based primarily on the activities of the tiny Office of Direct Foreign Investment. While all of
the salient issues make their appearance in the book, particular
readers are bound to disagree with the prominence or lack thereof
accorded to several of these issues, especially with regard to the
sources of the anomalies Freedman identifies as administrative
crises and the remedies he proposes. My criticisms touch on these
matters in some detail, but they are based on an overall evaluation
of the book as an excellent survey of the field.
Each generation, Freedman finds, has defined an administrative crisis in its own terms. Early fears that bureaucratic
agencies would destroy a static separation of powers gave way to an
early twentieth century debate over the propriety of administrative
procedures and of the judicial review of administrative action. Next,
vague administrative standards were criticized for leading to unpredictable decisions which are poorly understood by the public.
More recently, the blight of ex parte communications and influence,
the tendency for regulators to become the captives of the regulated,
and bureaucratic failures to protect the public interest or to live up
to claims of an extensive expertise have all been commented upon at
great length. Each of these dominant concerns was displaced by
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another, once theoretical explanations were fashioned and responsive legislation enacted.1 Nevertheless, public uneasiness continues
to be reflected in the strong and persistent challenges to administrative legitimacy that find their parallels elsewhere in national life:
Public skepticism of administrative expertise is part of a
larger loss of faith in many traditional sources of public
and social authority. And public concern with bureaucratization is part of a larger pattern of social uneasiness over
the impact upon American life of large organizations,
within both the public and private sectors!
Assertions like these and, indeed, the title of the book itself,
serve to transfer the crises into realms far larger than those addressed by Freedman, into areas of analysis which are currently in
vogue among sociologists and political scientists worldwide. The
best exposition of their approach is found in Jurgen Habermas's
Legitimation Crisis,3 a book which stimulates a great deal of interest on the continent but has caused scarcely a ripple here. Compared to the investigations of Habermas and others, Freedman's appear narrow and overly legalistic but not ethnocentric. While the
causes and cures he postulates are unduly restrictive, he displays a
sensitivity toward the specifically American dimension of a near
universal collapse of reverence for traditional sources of authority.
Freedman does not use the contentious concept of legitimacy in
a rigorous way. Early in the book we are told that legitimacy "is concerned with popular attitudes towards the exercise of governmental
power" - determinations of whether power is "exercised in accorJ. FREEDMAN, CRISIS AND LEGITIMACY 7-9 (1978).
Id. at 262.
3. J. HABERMAS. LEGITIMATION CRISIS 49 (1976). Habermas summarizes his
complex (and jargonistic) statement of the problem in four interrelated "crises" faced
by all Western countries:
- the economic system does not produce the requisite quantity of consumable values, or:
- the administrative system does not produce the requisite quantity of
rational decisions, or;
legitimation system does not provide the requisite quantity of
-the
generalized motivations, or;
- the socio-cultural system does not generate the requisite quantity of
action-motivating meaning.
Freedman really only discusses the second of these crises and, while the others receive
the briefest of mentions, he is presumably unaware of the degree of their interrelatedness that is illustrated so adroitly by Habermas.
1.
2.
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dance with a nation's laws, values, traditions and customs." When
power is so exercised, it endows "institutional decisions with an inherent capacity to attract obedience and respect. . . ."" The why and
how of these processes' are never explored convincingly, and subsequent analyses range vaguely around what are arguably theoretical
rather than real problems of legitimacy. At the core of Freedman's
commentaries are his rather unrealistic projections of public attitudes toward law, administration, the Constitution and government generally. Public perceptions are, Freedman concludes, "usually phrased in indiscriminantly general terms" and have entered the
"conventional vocabulary of political discourse"' in ways which impair
administrative legitimacy, "yet these perceptions lack the substantive weight of a successful indictment. Many of them are misconceived as conclusions of historical fact or misinformed as judgments
of administrative practice."7 These generalizations by the public are
*"quiteimpossible," given the wide variance in agency performance.
"If the .. .administrative process is to be evaluated fairly, public
expectations as to its institutional capacities must be informed and
realistic."' Freedman misses the mark here. Public attitudes may,
from his idealist or theoretical perspective, be unfair, misconceived
or misinformed yet have a decisive political impact simply because
people tend to act on their beliefs when there is no risk in doing so.
Given the numerous legal and administrative defects and weak4. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 1,at 10.
5. In Western societies, the major sources of legitimacy encompass discursive justification and/or canny manipulation. To the extent that legitimacy exists,
fewer of the other types of resources used to secure compliance with private and
public decisions need be deployed. The legitimation process is a circular one, however:
flows (rather than stocks) of legitimacy are augmented as well as depleted through the
timely implementation of policies thought by the public to be sensible; and many of the
resources used to secure compliance with political and administrative decisions, such
as charisma, ideology, law, public participation, coercion and the wise exercise of an
unfettered discretion, also serve as sources of legitimacy. See R. DAHRENDORF, CLASS
AND CLASS CONFLICT IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY 200 (1959); S. FINER, COMPARATIVE GOVERNMENT 29-30 (1970); L. FRIEDMAN, THE LEGAL SYSTEM 112 (1975); J. HABERMAS, supra
note 3, at xiv, 7-8; R. JACKSON & M. STEIN, ISSUES IN COMPARATIVE POLITICS 206 (1971);
G. LENSKI, POWER AND PRIVILEGE 57 (1966). But cf. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 126:
Legitimation crises are fueled by the "belier' that, in a constitutional democracy,
governmental power can only be legitimated if it is created by a constitution or exercised by persons directly accountable to the public. This narrow assertion may constitute another attempt at a definition of legitimacy, although Freedman notes that
this belief does not "adequately reflect the more subtle realities, the more accommodating resiliencies of American constitutional practice."
6. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 116.
7. Id at 125.
8. Id. at 264.
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nesses he documents, public attitudes may also constitute appropriate responses to incompetence. Rather than simply deplore the state
of public opinion, as Freedman does, it is more profitable to determine: who is resisting which bureaucratic actions and how? Whose
interests are and are not served by particular laws and policies?
Contra Freedman's perceptions of public opinion, there is evidence
which suggests that individuals and groups do ask these kinds of
questions, balancing rationally the sometimes irrationally-perceived
losses (most often, of privacy, free enterprise, etc.-'rights' to be
left alone) and gains from each administrative program or ploy.9 In
other words, attitudes toward the administrative process as a whole
are more complex and rational than Freedman would have us
believe.
His interpretations of public attitudes toward a constitutional
separation of powers are particularly suspect. Admittedly, this concept marked a significant political innovation, but there is little
evidence that, outside of some law schools and political science
departments, it retains what Freedman terms "an enduring hold on
the American imagination."10 Such evidence as exists suggests,
rather, that there is scant reverence for leading constitutional
precepts." While significant interest groups do prefer a government
with limited capacities, they are not particularly concerned with the
mechanics of segregating these narrow functions. Further, I would
argue that Congress and the Supreme Court (and, for that matter,
the Presidency) are not currently held in such high regard that the
bulk of the populace would welcome their shouldering additional
responsibilities concerning administration. If my contention has
merit, it leads to the conclusion that most of Freedman's policy
prescriptions would not serve to legitimate administrative processes
significantly. Many of his proposals concern the practical basis for
more careful delegations of legislative powers, an exacting supervision by "informed generalists who recognize the limitations of the
claims of [administrative] expertise," an effective insulating of agencies from the malevolent influences of presidents and special in9. See J. BUCHANAN & G. TULLOCH, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT (1962);
Meltzer & Vellrath, The Effects of Economic Policies on Votes for the Presidency, 18
J.L. & ECON. 781 (1975); Riker & Ordeshook, A Theory of the Calculus of Voting, 62
AM. POL. Sci. REV. 25 (1968).
10. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 15-17. K.C. Davis is quoted for the proposition that separation of powers is the "principle doctrinal barrier to administrative
development." Id. at 16.
11. See, e.g., the 1970 CBS poll discussed in B. SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS
OF MANKIND 192-3 (1977).
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol14/iss2/5
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terest groups, and additional assurances of procedural fairness-invariably through careful and searching judicial interpretations of
the Constitution and the Administrative Procedure Act of 1946.
These reforms would, of course, lay heavy additional burdens
on Congress and the courts. If we accept Freedman's most general
explanations of the crises in administration, 3 these organs would be
unable to advance the cause of administrative legitimacy because
they must labor under legitimation crises similar to those which afflict the bureaucracy. These include: a lack of expertise in administrative matters; perceived abuses of power, instances of Congressional venality and the lack of popular (or constitutional) sanction for the breadth of judicial power; and the absence of the genuine accountability which, under popular conceptions of participatory democracy, is seen to stem from the independence and
tenure of judges and the subservience of Congress to pressure
groups. While the implementation of Freedman's suggestions would
presumably augment the formal elegance of administrative law, the
erosion of governmental legitimacy would clearly continue; each
branch must first set its own house firmly in order, and more
deeply-working remedies are called for. Some of Freedman's
precepts, the establishment of higher professional standards in administration and the maximum feasible participation in bureaucratic
decision-making by an informed public, move in the right direction.
There are many problematic elements in his extensive discussions of
procedural reforms, however.
These discussions begin with an accurate thumbnail sketch of
recent events:
As ennobling efforts were mounted to reverse deeply
rooted patterns of discrimination and injustice, the
rhetoric of the period encouraged individuals to identify
themselves as members of separate groups (often racial,
sexual or ethnic in nature) before they defined themselves
as members of the larger American community. Faced
with this situation, Americans did what societies often do
when social conflict threatens to disturb an existing sense
of stability and commonality: They turned to procedural
formality to establish a degree of confidence that the
government's authority, particularly to the extent that it
12. 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1976). J. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 21, 46, 56, 94.
See text accompanying note 18, infra.
13. See text accompanying note 2, supra.
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had the capacity to favor one group at the expense of
another, was exercised fairly."4
A widening and deepening of this formalization constitutes the major corrective Freedman would apply to administrative crises, i"
although he admits that the judicialization of administration which
hinders efficiency and effectiveness would continue apace. 6 Here he
takes refuge in formalism in an attempt to palliate disputes temporarily, a transparent attempt to paper over the lack of consensus
concerning administrative goals which can only perpetuate the sense
of crisis in administration." Not since Roosevelt have clearcut
bureaucratic goals commanded the political plurality required to
defy activist opponents of a public bureaucratization.
14. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 27.
15. Id. at 125-37, 265. Much of Freedman's approach is summarized in a quotation from Frankfurter, J. l/d. at 125): "The history of American freedom is no small
measure the history of procedure." Even as qualified ("in no small measure"), this
assertion is restricted to the protection of settled expectations and "negative" individual rights (freedoms "from" rather than freedoms "to")- inherent limits on
governmental power which are inadequate for analysis of the allocation of privileges
through contemporary administration. See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
7-8, 13 (1978).
16. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 22: "The methods of a trial are not wellsuited to tasks more legislative, supervisory, or "polycentric" in nature, such as the
regulation of commercial competition . . . or the allocation of a limited resource to one
or a few among many applicants." See Id. at 26-7. Judicialization is appropriate,
however, where an individual's civil liberties are at stake (Id. at 29). This assertion all
but negates the others, for virtually all objections to administration can be couched in
terms of infringements of civil liberties.
17. See Learned Hand quoted in G. JACOBSOHN, PRAGMATISM, STATESMANSHIP
AND THE SUPREME COURT 156 (1977):
This much I think I do know-that a society so riven that the spirit of
moderation is gone, no court can save; that a society where that spirit
flourishes no court need save; that in a society which evades its responsibility by thrusting upon the courts the nurture of that spirit, that spirit
in the end will perish.
An effective illustration of my assertion is provided by Freedman's evaluation of the
Equal Employment Opportunities Commission. See FREEDMAN. supra note 1, at 105-13.
The absence of a political consensus in this field has meant that the public support
needed to fortify the Agency is lacking. A variety of reasons were given for combining
the Commission's large task with very weak and limited powers: fears of unfair hearings and the imposition of quotas on employment, the anticipated resistance of subtle
employment practices, formed over generations, to traditional regulatory techniques,
the ability of civil rights groups to obtain a separate redress through the courts, and
the need to experiment with an administrative informality. While some of these
arguments may be attractive in theory, Freedman finds that they do little more than
"make a virtue of necessity." I would argue that the same kinds of conclusions can be
drawn with regard to the many other agencies where a consensus concerning their
goals is lacking: e.g., the FTC, as compared with the SEC. See id. at 97-104.
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Freedman's "existing sense of stability and commonality" has
been difficult to discern in the administrative arena since World
War II, as he acknowledges indirectly at several junctures:
The basic ambivalence of the American toward governmental intervention in the economy has prevented the
development of a coherent philosophy of governmental
regulation and has had disturbing consequences for the
legitimacy of . . . administrative agencies.'"

[There is] general agreement . . . that the appropriate extent of governmental activism . . . lies somewhere between the polarities defined by Adam Smith and Karl
Marx, between the polemical positions, as it were, of
Milton Friedman and John Kenneth Gailbraith. An
ideology of such imprecision may befit a pragmatic people,
but it is hardly adequate to delimit the perennial debate ...
on the proper role of government in regulating the
economy. 9
How, then, should we deal with this state of affairs? Freedman
argues that gains in administrative legitimacy would result from
"requiring that democratic practice conform more nearly to
democratic theory":
If the courts were to insist more forcefully than they have
. . that Congress resolve the basic policy issues implicit
in such legislation, the consequence might sometimes be
no legislation. . . . But if legislation is supposed to be a
democratic expression of the nation's will, that result
would not always be untoward: sometimes a nation has no
will sufficiently focused or widely shared to permit present expression through a majority."
*

18. Id. at 56-7.
19. Id. at 33. Freedman also quotes Robert Dahl, id. at 75, for a proposition
which is best expressed in R. DAHL & C. LINDBLOOM, POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND
WELFARE 231 (1976).

We in this country have had to embrace two unreconciled ideologies, one
for public declamation, the other for private use. The one is radically
egalitarian and if pursued would demand a revolutionary transformation
in the whole structure of our society; the other is radically hierarchical
and its pursuit has in fact led to a revolutionary transformation of the
whole agrarian structure of society ....

Jefferson in 1800 or Jackson in

1830 would have said [that this hierarchical ideology is]... irreconcilable
with democracy and hardly distinguishable from tyranny.
20. J. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 94.
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This somewhat hedged return to a minimal law and state, while
perhaps conducive to a more coherent system of administrative law,
would confer veto powers on the major pressure groups active in
Congress-powers even greater than those they currently exercise.
It is difficult to see which "democratic theory" Freedman has in
mind, for few gains in representativeness would result, yet governmental paralysis would increase.2 This would hardly be instrumental to an administrative legitimacy.
The most promising alternative would be to alter the terms of
the ideological debate concerning the proper role of administration,
as has been done by ideologues of the welfare state and social
democracy in Britain and Germany. Roosevelt set a similar process
in motion and gradually gained adherents, but prosperity, personal
security and changes in the nature of Presidential politics prompted
a return to an administrative laissez faire. While an insecure financial future has returned to haunt most of us, the tide is currently
running in favor of still less government. To legitimate administrative processes in this climate of opinion would require,
above all, a consistent statesmanship. This old-fashioned quality is in
notoriously short supply at present.22 It denotes the capable pursuit
of a compelling personal vision of the public interest, whether or not
this vision is the popular one. The legitimation of administration in
21. Some of the problems associated with Freedman's "requiring that democratic practice conform more nearly to democratic theory" are suggested by R. DAHL &
C. LINDBLOOM, note 17 supra, and W. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT

135 (1971):

A two-candidate election provides about as much information on the
popular preferences as would the selection of a fixed diet for a severalyear period from a menu which includes only two fixed diets, where the
price and same of the elements of the diet are obscure, the capability of
the chef is uncertain, a bar girl and a rock band are distracting one's attention, and there is only one place to eat in a very large region. Moreover, the process for selecting the two menus assures that they will be
similar.
As even the best of legislation is "seriously incomplete," courts could choose to nullify
even a consensus legislative policy through a rigorous statutory interpretation. Landes
& Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest-Group Perspective, 18 J.L. &
ECON. 875, 879 (1975).
22. And in the past, too. Perhaps we can recognize a contemporary politician
or two in the words of John Dryden ("Absalom and Achitophel," 1:540):
A man so various that he seem'd to be
Not one, but all mankind's epitome;
Stiff in opinions, always in the wrong,
Was everything by starts, and nothing long.
But in the course of one revolving moon,
Was chymist, fiddler, statesman, and buffoon.
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America today is, in other words, an intensely political process with
a gloomy future, one in which law can, at best, play only a subordinate role. While Freedman does take limited account of these
kinds of arguments," the prescriptions he offers are sufficiently
unrealistic to provoke intense debate among public lawyers and
political scientists, flowing logically as they do from his informed
descriptions of administrative processes.
23. See J. FREEDMAN, supra note 1, at 260:
That successive generations of lawyers, judges, political scientists, and
citizens have failed to still the recurrent sense of crisis attending the
federal administrative process, even though each has made important efforts to do so, suggests that the sources of the sense of crisis are more
fundamental than the dominant concerns of our particular historical moment would indicate.
Edmund Burke (quoted in Id. at 255): "Constitute government how you please, infinitely the greater part of it must depend upon . . . the prudence and uprightness of
ministers of State." James M. Landis. Quoted in id. at 121: "Good men can make poor
laws workable [roughly, the history of English administrative law]; poor men will
wreak havoc with good laws."
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